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ONE MAN’S CEILING IS ANOTHER MAN’S 
FLOOR: THE EFFECT OF POST-REMOVAL 
DAMAGE STIPULATIONS ON THE AMOUNT IN 
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT OF A 
DIVERSITY CASE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical. On one particular Wednesday at 3 
a.m., Rene Magritte experienced abdominal pains and rushed to St. Cecilia 
Hospital, a small branch of the Graceland Care System. During his visit, Mr. 
Magritte received treatment from Dr. Garfunkel, the only physician on-duty 
in the emergency room. Dr. Garfunkel diagnosed Mr. Magritte with 
appendicitis. Because the appendix had not ruptured, Dr. Garfunkel wanted 
to take the time to prepare Mr. Magritte and his wife Georgette, as well as 
soothe their worries. Before the operation began, Mr. Magritte’s appendix 
burst causing increased medical costs and complications. Mr. Magritte 
survived the operation and continued with short-term hospitalization without 
permanent injury. 
Rene and Georgette Magritte filed a complaint in State A’s state court for 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium, alleging 
malpractice on the part of Dr. Garfunkel and negligence on the part of the 
Graceland Care System. They alleged the fact that damages were “in excess 
of $10,000,” in accordance with State A’s rules of procedure. The Graceland 
Care System is incorporated in State B and also has its principal place of 
business in State B. Similarly, Dr. Garfunkel is a citizen of State C, a 
neighboring state. The defendants filed a notice of removal under diversity 
jurisdiction. In response, the Magrittes filed a binding damage stipulation 
stating that the amount in controversy was less than $75,000. They then filed 
a motion for remand, arguing that the amount in controversy did not exceed 
the amount in controversy requirement. The parties must now contend with 
the fact that there is no established rule on whether a post-removal damage 
stipulation destroys diversity jurisdiction by reducing the amount in 
controversy. 
The previous hypothetical demonstrates the competing interests involved 
in a state case removed to federal court. The plaintiff, as master of the 
   Paul, Simon, One Man’s Ceiling Is Another Man’s Floor, on THERE GOES RHYMIN SIMON 
(Warner Records 1973). 
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complaint, should have control over the venue of his action. In contrast, the 
defendant should have access to federal courts and a trial free from the bias 
of the plaintiff’s home state. The parties’ interests in forum control oppose 
the principle that courts disapprove of forum manipulation and forum 
shopping. At the same time, in the context of federalism, there is a strong 
preference that state courts settle state claims. 
The recent Sixth Circuit case, Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1 took the 
position that damage stipulations such as the one in the introductory 
hypothetical cannot prevent removal through diversity jurisdiction.2 By doing 
so, the Sixth Circuit followed the approach of the other circuit courts of 
appeal that have addressed the issue. This Recent Development examines 
those cases and the issues surrounding damage stipulations in removal 
proceedings. Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has settled the 
issue, this Recent Development also proposes a solution that balances the 
different interests. 
To understand the different issues involved, one should first examine the 
process of removal. When a plaintiff brings suit in a state court, the case does 
not necessarily remain in state court. Title 28 of the United States Code 
creates the process of removal by which a defendant can move a state case to 
a federal court if the parties have “original jurisdiction.”3 If there is no 
“federal question” to establish “original jurisdiction,” the parties must 
establish the following requirements: (1) complete diversity of citizenship, 
meaning that all of the plaintiffs are citizens of different states than all of the 
defendants; and (2) an amount in controversy for the case that exceeds the 
statutory requirement set forth in § 1332 of Title 28, which has increased 
most recently to $75,000.4 
Neither Title 28 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, state 
the manner in which the parties must establish the amount in controversy 
requirement. All courts examine the plaintiff’s pleadings for an allegation of 
an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirement, but the 
plaintiff’s complaint in state court is often ambiguous and does not allege a 
specific amount.5 Without an established method of proof, the courts must 
 1. Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 953 
(2001). 
 2. Id. at 871. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
 4. The amount in controversy requirement began at the amount of $500 and has progressively 
increased to $2,000, $3,000, $10,000, and $50,000. For more discussion of the increases in the amount 
in controversy requirement, see infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
 5. Most states prohibit the plaintiff from alleging damages of a specific amount by state statute 
or local rules. For more discussion on non-specific complaints, see infra notes 23-25 and 
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apply their discretion. The courts follow different approaches to prove the 
amount in controversy, and several circuits use completely different 
standards to establish the amount.6 Some circuits look at evidence after the 
defendant has filed the petition for removal.7 Other circuits do not look 
beyond the defendant’s notice for facts establishing the amount in 
controversy.8 Although some district courts have allowed a post-removal 
damage stipulation by the plaintiff to destroy federal diversity jurisdiction, 
the circuits that have ruled on the issue have generally prohibited those 
stipulations from destroying diversity jurisdiction. 
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the background of removal 
in diversity cases, the topic of damage stipulations, and court rulings on the 
issue of diversity jurisdiction amid damage stipulations. First, this Recent 
Development will explain the statutory background that creates removal. 
Sections 1332,9 1446,10 and 144711 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
explicitly permit the removal of state cases and detail its requirements. 
Second, this Recent Development will provide a brief foundation on the topic 
of damage stipulations. Third, this Recent Development will examine the 
most important cases that have ruled on jurisdiction following post-removal 
damage stipulations. Although the Supreme Court has established some rules 
on removal guidelines, modern courts disagree on the ability of post-removal 
damage stipulations to destroy federal diversity jurisdiction. 
Part III analyzes the different approaches that courts have taken, and the 
opposing interests of the parties and the court system. 
Part IV proposes an approach to post-removal damage stipulations that 
brings about a compromise of the different interests as well as common law 
principles applied by the courts in diversity jurisdiction cases. 
accompanying text. 
 6. This Recent Development does not address the proper burden of proof for removal through 
diversity jurisdiction. For a discussion of the different approaches that the circuits have taken, see C. 
Kinnier Lastimosa, Note, Automatic for Removal?: The Use of Post-Petition Evidence to Establish the 
Amount in Controversy for Diversity Jurisdiction, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 299 (2002). 
 7. See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 
994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Sierminski v. 
Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 8. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992); Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871 
(10th Cir. 1995) cert. denied 516 U.S. 863 (1995). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000). 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Removal 
Congress detailed the basis of federal jurisdiction in Title 28 § 1332 and 
§ 1441 of the United States Code. Section 1332 enumerates the requirements 
for federal jurisdiction.12 Thus, if a plaintiff brings an action in state court, 
the defendant may still have access to the federal court system by the process 
of removal. Section 1441(a) provides that a defendant can remove an action 
from state court to federal court when the federal court has “original 
jurisdiction.”13 Original jurisdiction requires that there exists: (1) either a 
federal question issue,14 or (2) complete diversity between the plaintiffs and 
defendants and an amount in controversy in excess of a statutory amount, 
which is now $75,000.15 
When Congress first created diversity jurisdiction,16 an allegation could 
establish federal jurisdiction when the amount in controversy for the claim 
exceeded $500.17 Since then, Congress has amended the minimum dollar 
amount required for the amount in controversy. Congress increased the 
requisite amount to $2,000 in 1887, to $3,000 in 1911, to $10,000 in 1958, 
and to $50,000 in 1988.18 In 1996, Congress made the most recent increase to 
the current statutory requirement of $75,000.19 
Under § 1446 of Title 28 of the United States Code, removal must follow 
a specific process. To remove a case from a state court to the federal court, 
which must embrace the original court, the defendant must file a “notice” of 
removal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 The 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 16. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established diversity jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of 
Sept. 24, 1789, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80. 
 17. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 18. See id. (creating the $500 requirement in the amount of controversy); Act of March 3, 1887, 
24 Stat. 552 (increasing the amount in controversy to $2,000); Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091 
(increasing the amount in controversy to $3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 
Stat. 415. (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and increasing the amount in controversy requirement to 
$10,000); The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Act of November 19, 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-7002, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642 (increasing the amount in controversy to $50,000). 
 19. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205,110 Stat. 3847. 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The latest increase lacks substantial legislative history. Taking into 
account the legislative history of the prior increase, one might infer that Congress wanted to reduce the 
number of diversity cases in federal court and factor inflation into the amount. 14B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3701, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1998). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000). 
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notice must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for 
removal.”21 Furthermore, the defendant must do so within thirty days22 of the 
defendant’s service or “otherwise,” whichever is shorter.23 If the action is not 
initially removable, the defendant may remove within thirty days after the 
amendment, but never more than one year after the action commences. In 
some cases, the plaintiff may have the case put back in state court, because 
subsection (4) provides that “[i]f it clearly appears on the face of the notice 
. . . that removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for 
summary remand.”24 
A plaintiff’s complaint usually does not allege damages that satisfy the 
amount in controversy requirement. One reason for this circumstance is that 
most states prohibit an allegation of damages in a specific amount.25 Instead, 
in these states, the plaintiff may only allege damages in an amount, for 
example, “in excess of $10,000,” to allow for a determination of the proper 
state court.26 Most plaintiffs usually do not allege damages large enough to 
meet the federal jurisdictional requirement of $75,000, because state courts 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 22. Courts begin counting the thirty days at different times. Some courts begin counting after 
formal service. See, e.g., Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
Other courts begin counting after defendant “otherwise” receives service. See, e.g., Reece v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4) (2000).  
 25. Florida courts, for example, require that the complaint allege damages “in excess of $15,000” 
to satisfy their circuit court jurisdictional amount. Charles A. Carlson, Removal to Federal Court on 
the Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction: The “Amount in Controversy” Controversy, 69 FLA. B. J. 77 (Oct. 
1995).  
 Some states’ rules on civil procedure do not allow a plaintiff to allege any amount in the 
complaint whatsoever. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (providing that in Colorado “[n]o dollar amount 
shall be stated in the prayer or demand for relief”). In Colorado, some courts allow evidence, such as 
the evidence used in summary judgment motions. Michael J. Hofmann, A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Removal, 29 COLO. LAW., 49, 52 (2000). See also IOWA R. CIV. P. 70(a) (“[A] pleading shall not state 
the specific amount of money damages sought but shall state whether the amount of damages meets 
applicable jurisdictional requirements for amount in controversy. The specific amount and elements of 
monetary damages sought may be obtained through discovery.”). Moreover, the Iowa Code provides 
that “[i]n an action for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount of money damages demanded 
shall not be stated in the petition, original notice, or any counterclaim or cross-petition.” IOWA CODE 
§ 619.18 (1998). 
 26. Most states prohibit pleadings for specific damages because states want to prevent 
complaints from generating adverse publicity and embarrassment, for example, in cases against 
physicians when a plaintiff seeks damages for more than a million dollars. Alice M. Noble-Allgire, 
Removal of Diversity Actions when the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face 
of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal 
Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681, 689 n.14 (1997). 
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sometimes penalize specific pleadings27 or sympathize with plaintiffs more 
than federal courts do.28 
B. Court Treatment of Damage Stipulations after Removal 
1. The Supreme Court 
In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,29 the Supreme Court 
held that a reduction of the damages claimed below the amount in 
controversy requirement does not destroy diversity jurisdiction in the federal 
courts.30 The plaintiff filed a complaint in state court for damages in the sum 
of $4,000 at which time the jurisdictional minimum was an amount in 
controversy in excess of $3,000.31 The defendants successfully petitioned for 
removal of the case to federal court.32 The plaintiff filed a second complaint 
that repeated the first complaint’s allegations as well as damages in the sum 
of $4,000.33 The plaintiff attached an exhibit to the second complaint, 
however, that alleged injuries in the sum of $1,380.89.34 The court granted 
relief to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,162.98.35  
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the reduction in the amount 
claimed did not destroy diversity jurisdiction.36 The Court stated that when a 
plaintiff brings a case in state court and the court removes the case to federal 
court, “[t]here is a strong presumption that the plaintiff has not claimed a 
large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a federal court[.]”37 The Court 
reasoned that the plaintiff’s complaint controls the venue, because the 
defendant files the petition for removal before the defendant benefits from 
 27. In some state courts, a plaintiff risks dismissal for pleading a specific amount in excess of the 
state requirement. Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the Jurisdictional Amount in 
Controversy Pursuant to State Statutory Limitations on Pleading Damage Claims, 29 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 1091, 1092-93 (1996). For some examples of states that prohibit specific pleadings, see supra 
note 22. 
 28. Plaintiffs also try to defeat federal jurisdiction, either by alleging an amount of damages less 
than the jurisdictional minimum or by filing joinder of a defendant who is a citizen in the state in 
which the plaintiff brought action. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, 107 (1992). 
 29. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
 30. Id. at 295. 
 31. Id. at 285. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 292. The Court stated that the district court retains jurisdiction if “the plaintiff after 
removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the 
requisite amount[.]” Id. 
 
 37. Id. at 290. 
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discovery tools.38 The Court also reasoned that the plaintiff should not be 
able to manipulate the court system to exercise complete control over the 
venue and to defeat the defendant’s right to the federal forum once that right 
exists.39 The Court further stated that events that occur subsequent to removal 
to reduce the amount in controversy, such as an amendment to the pleading 
that reduces the alleged damages, whether in the control of the plaintiff or 
not, do not destroy the federal jurisdiction.40 
2. The Circuits 
In Angus v. Shiley,41 the Third Circuit held that a post-removal damage 
stipulation could not destroy federal jurisdiction.42 After the defendant filed a 
notice of removal, the plaintiff filed an answer to the notice that stipulated 
that “her damages d[id] not exceed the sum of $50,000.00[,]” at a time when 
the amount in controversy was $50,000.43 The Third Circuit reasoned that the 
plaintiff’s damage stipulation had “no legal significance,” because simply 
amending a complaint cannot destroy federal jurisdiction.44 The Third Circuit 
stated that the allegation in the complaint determines the amount in 
controversy.45 The plaintiff argued that the total claim was for damages of 
$40,000; below the $50,000 jurisdictional requirement at the time. The Third 
Circuit stated that a court should not use the “low-end of an open-ended 
claim” to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement; instead, a court 
should make “a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being litigated” 
to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.46 The Third Circuit further 
stated that the district court properly found the amount in controversy in an 
independent appraisal, because the complaint did not “limit its request for 
damages to a precise monetary amount.”47 
In Asociacion Nacional De Pescadores A Pequena Escala O Artesanales 
De Colombia (ANPAC) v. Dow Quimica De Columbia S.A.,48 the Fifth 
Circuit allowed an affidavit by the plaintiff’s attorney to destroy diversity 
 38. Id. at 291. 
 39. Id. at 294. 
 40. Id. at 293. 
 41. 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 42. Id. at 145. 
 43. Id. at 144. 
 44. Id. at 145. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 146. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 988 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. 
Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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jurisdiction and trigger remand.49 The plaintiffs filed their original complaint 
in state court and did not allege a specific amount of damages in accordance 
with state law.50 The defendant filed a notice of removal that alleged “the 
matter in controversy exceed[ed] $50,000 exclusive of interests and costs.”51 
In the notice, the defendant failed to elaborate on the damages or allege any 
specific facts.52 In turn, the plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit that the 
damages for each defendant amounted to less than $50,000.53 The court 
stated that an affidavit may “clarify a petition that previously left the 
jurisdictional question ambiguous.”54 The court further reasoned that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege a specific amount of damages and the 
defendant neither based its notice on direct knowledge of the amount in 
controversy nor rebutted the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ attorney.55 The Fifth 
Circuit restricted its holding to situations when those conditions exist, and it 
stated as dictum that a plaintiff may not defeat removal, however, by 
amending his damage request.56 
In De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.,57 the Fifth Circuit further narrowed the 
principle it stated earlier that year in ANPAC. The plaintiffs filed a complaint 
in state court without seeking a specific amount of damages.58 Following the 
defendant’s notice, the district court removed the case to federal court.59 The 
plaintiffs made a motion to remand, arguing that the action did not meet the 
amount in controversy requirement for each plaintiff.60 To support the 
contention, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit by their attorney that stated “the 
damages did not exceed $49,000 per plaintiff.”61 The district court denied the 
motion to remand.62  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision63 because an 
affidavit stipulating damages below the amount in controversy requirement 
 49. Id. at 566. 
 50. Id. at 562. 
 51. Id. at 565. 
 52. Id. at 566. 
 53. Id. at 562. 
 54. Id. at 565. 
 55. Id. at 566. 
 56. Id. at 565. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292 (1938). 
 57. 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 58. Id. at 56. The plaintiffs filed the complaint in Texas state court, and Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 47(b) prohibits a specific damage pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 47 (“An original pleading 
. . . shall contain . . . only the statement that the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits of 
the court[.]”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 57. 
 62. Id. at 59. 
 63. Id. 
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only created a rebuttal presumption.64 The court expressed the preference that 
parties, in this case the plaintiffs, not manipulate the system to forum shop.65 
The Fifth Circuit then ruled that the claims exceeded the jurisdictional 
minimum because the claims met the “facially apparent” standard and the 
“legal certainty” standard.66 To establish the jurisdictional minimum, the 
Fifth Circuit used the defendant’s evidence that the plaintiffs sought damages 
as high as $5,000,000 in other courts for the injuries of the same 
transaction.67  
In Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods Inc.,68 the Seventh Circuit 
held that a court may not consider any damage stipulation by the plaintiff that 
follows removal. In accordance with state statute, the plaintiff filed a 
complaint for non-specific damages “in excess of $15,000.”69 The defendant 
filed a notice for removal under diversity jurisdiction and succeeded.70 The 
plaintiff’s motion for remand failed, and following the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim without 
prejudice.71 Two years later, the plaintiff brought the same action to state 
court again.72 The defendant removed the case after notice.73 That same day, 
the plaintiff attempted to defeat jurisdiction by stipulating that she would not 
seek damages in excess of the amount in controversy requirement.74 The 
Seventh Circuit stated that the federal courts still possess jurisdiction if “the 
plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his 
pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount[.]”75 The Seventh 
Circuit distinguished the Fifth Circuit case, ANPAC,76 by stating that the 
record in the case at bar presented facts that established the amount in 
controversy.77 
In Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,78 the Sixth Circuit held that a post-
 64. Id. at 57. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 57-58. 
 67. Id. at 58. There was no implication of collateral estoppel or res judicata because there was no 
“final judgment” from the prior proceedings. 
 68. 110 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 69. Id. at 426. Illinois civil procedure law prohibits requests for relief in specific amounts and 
provides that “no ad damnum may be pleaded except to the minimum extent necessary to comply with 
the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is filed.” 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-604 (1996). 
 70. 110 F.3d at 426. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 427. 
 75. Id. at 429 citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288. 
 76. 988 F.2d 559. 
 77. 110 F.3d at 430. 
 78. 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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removal damage stipulation below the amount in controversy does not 
mandate remand.79 The plaintiff filed a complaint in a state that allowed 
specific damage pleadings,80 seeking $950,000 in damages.81 After the 
defendant’s notice, the court removed the case to federal court.82 The parties 
agreed to dismissal and the district court dismissed the case without 
prejudice.83 During the following year, the plaintiff filed a new complaint in 
state court, alleging damages “not exceeding $75,000.”84 The defendant 
again filed a notice of removal and established the amount in controversy 
requirement with answers to interrogatories from the prior action.85 The 
plaintiff filed a motion to remand and claimed the action did not meet the 
jurisdictional amount.86 Along with the motion, the plaintiff presented an 
affidavit stating that she “had no intention of seeking additional damages” 
and attached a stipulation that her damages did not exceed $75,000.87  
The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand,88 and the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s interpretation of St. Paul Mercury 
Indemnity Co.89 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a court determines 
jurisdiction from the time of removal.90 The Sixth Circuit further justified its 
holding by stating the policy that discourages the plaintiff’s manipulation of 
the court system to shop for a different forum.91 The Sixth Circuit explicitly 
stated that even a binding stipulation would not destroy diversity jurisdiction 
in the federal courts.92 
3. District Courts 
Despite the prohibitive holdings by many circuits, many district courts 
have allowed a post-removal damage stipulation to destroy federal 
jurisdiction. Those courts have examined specific factors and restricted their 
 79. Id. at 871. 
 80. The plaintiff filed the case in Tennessee state court. Id. at 870. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. A federal court may recognize all state court discovery. See Salveson v. Western States 
Bankcard Ass’n, 526 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981) rev’d in part on other grounds 731 F.2d 1423 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 871. 
 89. 303 U.S. 283. 
 90. 230 F.3d at 871. 
 91. Id. at 873. 
 92. Id. 
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holdings to specific situations. In Oder v. Buckeye State Mutual Insurance,93 
the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana allowed a damage 
stipulation to limit the amount in controversy to an amount below the 
jurisdictional requirement. The district court stated that the binding 
“certification” limited what the plaintiff could both seek and receive.94 The 
court distinguished the case from St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.95 by 
stating that the plaintiff in the case at bar had detailed the complaint for the 
first time,96 as opposed to the plaintiff in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. 
who reduced the amount sought from the prior complaint. 
In Adkins v. Gibson,97 the District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia remanded a case to state court after the plaintiff filed a non-binding 
damage stipulation. The court reasoned that the stipulation bound the 
plaintiff with penalty of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,98 
the Local Rules of the court, and the Rules of Professional Conduct.99 The 
district court also cited the following principles: (1) the plaintiff’s complaint 
controls, and (2) courts should construe removal statutes strictly with doubts 
favoring remand.100 The district court stated that binding stipulations could 
assist the court when the amount in controversy is uncertain.101  
In Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,102 the District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama remanded a case after the plaintiff filed a damage 
stipulation to destroy diversity jurisdiction. The district court asserted that the 
1988 amendments to § 1447 (c) and (e) “clearly overruled” the Supreme 
Court’s holding in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. and advocated the 
“primacy of state courts.”103 The court reasoned that the specific changes in 
 93. 817 F. Supp. 1413 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 303 U.S. 283. 
 96. 817 F. Supp. at 1413-14. 
 97. 906 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. W. Va. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by McCoy v. Erie Ins. 
Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D. W. Va. 2001). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. A party must make every representation to the court “to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). If the court determines that there is a violation of Rule 11(b), 
“the court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties . . . 
responsible for the violation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 99. 906 F. Supp. at 348. This threat of punishment contrasts with the lack of punishment for the 
typical complaint that underestimates damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) (“[E]very final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings.”).  
 100. 906 F. Supp. at 346. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 981 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Ala. 1997). 
 103. Id. at 1416. 
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the statute’s language demonstrate that a court should remand the case 
whenever the parties can show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.104 
III. ANALYSIS  
The question at the core of the debate is whether a post-removal damage 
stipulation may reduce the value of a claim below the amount in controversy 
requirement. One must consider the following three competing interests 
when evaluating the weight of damage stipulations: (1) the principle that the 
plaintiff should be the master of the complaint; (2) the principle that a 
defendant should have equal access to the federal court system and to justice; 
(3) public policy concerns that include the desire for standardized rules, the 
preference that federal courts preside over large actions, and the aversion to 
forum shopping. 
The principle that the plaintiff should be master of the complaint is well 
established.105 The argument follows that a plaintiff should have the freedom 
to choose a state court even if the claim qualifies for the federal courts.106 
Plaintiffs often choose to litigate their claims in state court, because the fees 
are less costly107 and the juries more readily sympathize.108 In addition, if a 
plaintiff is willing to reduce the potential damages of a claim, the courts 
should give effect to stipulations to preserve the integrity of stipulations 
themselves.109 
The principle that the plaintiff should generally serve as master of the 
complaint meets opposition from the principle that the defendant should have 
access to the federal court system. Access to federal courts is particularly 
 104. Id. at 1417. Prior to the 1998 amendment subsection (c) provided that “[i]f at any time before 
final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district 
court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1986 
Supp.). The amended subsection (c) provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that 
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
(1988). The prior subsection (c) focuses the determination of jurisdiction at the time of removal 
whereas the amended subsection (c) focuses on the present existence of jurisdiction regardless of the 
time of removal. 981 F. Supp. at 1416-17. 
 105. See supra note 17, at 46 (“[T]he plaintiff is the master of his or her claim.”). 
 106. See LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURT 104 (1994) (posing the 
argument for deference to the plaintiff). See also Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d at 1335 (“[I]n 
the typical diversity case, the plaintiff remains the master of his complaint.”). 
 107. PURCELL, supra note 28, at 87. 
 108. Id. at 24. 
 109. See Bloome v. Wiseman, Shaikewitz, McGivern, Wahl, Flavin & Hesi, P.C., 664 N.E.2d 
1125, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“If stipulations are not enforced by the courts, . . . the litigation 
process will suffer. In short, if counsel cannot rely on the sanctity of a stipulation given in open court, 
there will be no stipulations.”). 
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important because state juries often discriminate against out-of-state 
defendants, especially when the defendant is a corporation.110 A large 
amount in controversy, in the millions of dollars for example, might bring 
either bias against a large out-of-state corporation or sympathy for an in-state 
plaintiff such that the trial does not reach a just verdict or award amount.111 
In addition, another important reason for the resolution of actions in 
federal court is that federal courts have standard rules of evidence and civil 
procedure that do not result in disparate results in various jurisdictions.112 
There are additional benefits when federal judges preside over a matter. 
Federal judges, unlike state judges, have life tenure and need not worry about 
political motives or the scrutiny of unpopular decisions from constituents.113 
In cases that have national repercussions, such as a class action,114 federal 
courts should preside when the amount in controversy is ambiguous and the 
case affects many people.115 
In addition, the interests of the plaintiff and defendant in forum control 
often oppose the principle that the parties in a dispute should not manipulate 
the court system by forum shopping.116 Parties often choose a specific forum 
so that they can benefit from that forum’s rules and judges.117 The plaintiff’s 
 110. See John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 406 
(1979) (stating that Congress created diversity jurisdiction because of the fear of prejudice against out-
of-state businesses). 
 111. The Senate stated the principle “[t]o deny the right to resort to the federal courts means that 
. . . one must seek justice in the courts of the state of his adversary where he will find, in many of the 
states, that trial has been denied the common-law powers necessary to the proper administration of 
justice.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 18 (1958). See S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 11 (2000). 
 112. Jonathan Turley, Essay, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS 433, 467 (2000). Some states may even go as far as to produce procedures that 
benefit their residents in litigation. Id. at 471-72. 
 113. See Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and Concurrent Federal and 
State Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity Jurisdiction; Removal; Preemption; Venue; 
Transfer of Venue; Personal Jurisdiction; Abstention and the All Writs Act, SE99 ALI-ABA 613, 634 
(2000). 
 114. Class actions have the capability of crippling entire agencies. Turley, supra note 112, at 467. 
 115. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adverstising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (giving an 
expansive reading of the amount in controversy because the dispute involved injuries to innumerable 
persons who were not parties to the dispute). In Hunt, North Carolina enacted a statute that prohibited 
all containers of apples shipped into the state from bearing any grade other than the U.S. grade, thus 
prohibiting the Washington State grading system, which was generally acknowledged to be superior to 
the U.S. grading system. Id. The Washington State Apple Advertising Commission brought suit, 
claiming that the statute discriminated against interstate commerce. Id. at 335. At the time of trial, 
Washington State was the largest producer of apples in the U.S., accounting for 30% of all 
domestically grown apples. Id. at 336. Washington apple growers ship 40 million closed containers of 
apples annually; nearly 500,000 of these containers reach North Carolina. Id. at 337. 
 116. See John Hart Ely, The Irrespressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 717 n.130 (1974) 
(stating the desire to minimize forum shopping). 
 117. See generally Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167 
(2000). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating reasons that 
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use of a damage stipulation to destroy federal jurisdiction has forum control 
as its primary motive.118 As stated above, defendants often prefer federal 
courts,119 but removal of a case to federal court can actually counteract the 
effects of a plaintiff’s forum shopping because of the standardized rules of 
civil procedure and evidence.120 The aversion to forum shopping carries 
significant weight in determining policy, and the resolution of cases in 
federal court helps prevent the disparate results that forum shopping causes. 
Damage stipulations are merely collusive attempts to destroy diversity 
jurisdiction and should not have effect. Federal statute already prohibits 
giving effect to certain actions that attempt to manipulate jurisdiction.121 In 
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.,122 the Supreme Court clearly stated that 
“events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount [in 
controversy] . . . do not oust the district court’s jurisdiction once it has 
attached.”123 In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., the plaintiff’s complaint 
originally demanded specific damages in excess of the amount in controversy 
requirement.124 The Supreme Court stated that a stipulation may not destroy 
jurisdiction if the plaintiff “reduces the claim below the requisite 
amount[.]”125 When a plaintiff files a damage stipulation, the plaintiff 
attempts to alter the amount in controversy and single-handedly control the 
forum. 
Some district courts have considered damage stipulations and have 
attempted to address the competing interests involved in removal. In Adkins 
v. Gibson,126 the district court remanded a case back to state court after the 
parties choose to litigate in federal courts). 
 118. Courts disfavor “attempts to divest courts of jurisdiction.” 123 A.L.R. FED. 323, § 2[a] at 
336. 
 119. Some critics state that corporate defendants often benefit from federal courts because of their 
resources in comparison to plaintiffs. See PURCELL, supra note 28, at 27 (stating that removal allows 
corporate defendants to “exploit their social and economic power when confronting relatively weak 
individual litigants”). 
 120. See Brian D. Boyle, Parallel State and Federal Court Class Actions, 31 THE BRIEF, Winter 
2002 at 33 (discussing the wide variation among the states’ procedural rules regarding class actions). 
The lack of standardized rules lead to disparate treatment and even inconsistent rulings in overlapping 
cases. Id. at 37. See also Ryan, supra note 117, at 168 (asserting that forum shopping regularly affects 
the outcome of a case). 
 121. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in 
which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to 
invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”). 
 122. 303 U.S. 283. 
 123. Id. at 293. 
 124. Id. at 285. The plaintiff claimed damages in the amount of $4,000. Id. At the time of the case, 
the amount in controversy requirement was $3,000. 
 125. Id. at 292. 
 126. 906 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. W. Va. 1995). 
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plaintiff made a damage stipulation that the amount in controversy did not 
exceed the jurisdictional minimum. The district court concluded that the non-
binding stipulation127 and accountability under Rule 11 shows that “the 
amount in controversy has been established to a legal certainty to be less than 
the jurisdictional minimum.”128 The court gave deference to the plaintiff’s 
stipulation, examined the record of the case, and stated that the defendant did 
not rebut the plaintiff’s claim of lower damages.129 The district court’s 
examination gave undue weight to the plaintiff’s interests as master of the 
complaint and relied heavily on the court system’s safeguards, specifically 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.130 
In Oder v. Buckeye State Mutual Insurance,131 the district court stated that 
the “certification” of damages allowed a remand because the stipulation 
represented the plaintiffs’ initial allegation of the amount of damages.132 The 
court determined that the certification bound the plaintiff by prohibiting the 
receipt of damages in excess of the stipulation even if the jury awarded such 
damages.133 The court improperly allowed a post-removal event to affect 
juridiction and permitted the plaintiff to manipulate the system and control 
the forum. 
In Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,134 the district court allowed a damage 
stipulation to destroy diversity jurisdiction despite the fact that the plaintiff 
initially sought $500,000 in damages in a state that allowed pleadings for 
specific damages.135 The district court addressed the issue of removal by 
studying at length the statutory construction of §1447(c) and (e). To further 
fortify its holding, the court, considering the plaintiff’s stipulation, stated that 
“[the plaintiff’s] self-imposed limitation [was] worth something[,]” because 
the plaintiff could never receive more than the stipulated amount.136 The 
court’s examination focused on statutory interpretation rather than the 
damage stipulation itself.137 A clearer rule on the effect of damage 
 127. The court stated that the stipulation was a “binding” representation. Id. at 348. The 
stipulation was not binding because the plaintiff could still receive proceeds from a verdict in excess of 
the stipulated amount. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 347. The court asserted that monetary losses were minimal. Id. The plaintiff stated 
sustained medical expenses were in the amount of $3,215.75. Id. The amount in controversy 
requirement at the time of trial was $50,000. 
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 131. 817 F. Supp. 1413. 
 132. Id. at 1414. 
 133. Id. at 1413. 
 134. 981 F. Supp. 1415. 
 135. Id. at 1415. 
 136. Id. at 1417. 
 137. See id. 
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stipulations would remove this type of hesitance in the courts and would not 
allow the plaintiff to define the amount in controversy on his own accord. 
In their decisions, many of the circuit courts properly weighed the 
competing interests involved in removal, and their opinions demonstrate the 
importance of a standard approach toward post-removal damage stipulations. 
In Angus v. Shiley,138 the Third Circuit did not allow a post-removal damage 
stipulation to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that damages 
were in the amount of $40,000, much less than the $50,000 amount in 
controversy requirement at the time of removal. The Third Circuit cited Hunt 
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission139 for the proposition that 
a court should measure the amount in controversy from a “reasonable 
reading” rather than the “low end” of a claim.140 In Angus, the court only 
litigated the plaintiff’s injury, which was calculated below the requisite 
amount, and the damage stipulation further attested to that limited amount.141 
In its opinion, the Third Circuit acted in fairness and allowed removal. 
In Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods,142 the Seventh Circuit 
prohibited the consideration of a post-removal damage stipulation. The 
Seventh Circuit made its rule, however, after ruling on the amount in 
controversy requirement on the merits. The Seventh Circuit’s primary 
rationale for the rule relied on strong evidence that established to a 
“reasonable probability” that the dispute met the amount in controversy 
requirement.143 The court avoided the plaintiff’s attempt to manipulate the 
court system and permitted removal despite the uncertainty. 
In Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,144 the Sixth Circuit held that a post-
removal damage stipulation does not require remand.145 The Sixth Circuit 
stated that the court should treat a post-removal stipulation “like any other 
post-removal event.”146 The court gave the most weight to the policy against 
forum shopping and manipulation of the court system.147 In the case, the 
plaintiffs disclosed the fact that the damages amounted to approximately 
 138. 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 139. 432 U.S. at 337. 
 140. 989 F.2d at 146. 
 141. Id. at 142. 
 142. 110 F.3d 424. 
 143. The Seventh Circuit relied on the several facts. (1) Chase made one settlement offer of 
$120,000. Id. at 428. (2) In addition, at the beginning of litigation, Chase refused to admit that the case 
was worth an amount below the jurisdictional requirement. Id. (3) Chase alleged “serious, disabling 
physical and mental injuries that would result in loss of future earning potential[.]” Id. (4) The district 
court refused to remand when Chase brought the action the first time. Id. 
 144. 230 F.3d 868. 
 145. Id. at 872. 
 146. Id. 
 
 147. Id. at 873. 
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$500,000.148 Because the stipulation failed to bind the plaintiff and because 
damages could have amounted to $500,000, the Sixth Circuit correctly 
prohibited remand. 
Underlying the approach by the circuit courts of appeal are the procedural 
traps for the defendant. Although some cases are prohibited from proceeding 
in state court,149 there are significant reasons that the use of diversity 
jurisdiction should be used in doubt. First, a defendant must contend with the 
thirty-day window of removability and the one-year deadline for removal.150 
In contrast, a plaintiff may file for remand at any time if the case does not 
meet the amount in controversy requirement.151 Second, a defendant may not 
appeal an order to remand the case.152 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Rarely does a plaintiff forgo the right to receive an award of proceeds in 
excess of a damage stipulation, regardless of how great the amount.153 Courts 
should not give excessive weight to a plaintiff’s damage stipulation, because 
an event occurring after removal should not destroy diversity jurisdiction.154 
If a plaintiff files a damage stipulation, the court should not give it any more 
weight than an affidavit. In states where a plaintiff has to make a non-specific 
damage pleading, a damage stipulation is a weapon that a plaintiff can use to 
manipulate the court system. 
For these reasons, this Recent Development proposes a standardized 
approach toward post-removal damage stipulations. A damage stipulation155 
should be admitted as evidence, just as affidavits. If a damage stipulation is 
the plaintiff’s only evidence, the defendant will easily prove that the claim 
 148. Id. at 872. 
 149. Congress has shown a preference for the resolution of certain actions in state courts. 
Defendants may not remove certain state actions to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2000). These 
actions include actions against a railroad company, actions that arise under worker’s compensation, 
and actions that derive from the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Id. See YACKLE, supra note 
114, at 47 (stating that the most serious reform groups agree that courts should reduce the federal 
caseload by leaving state law claims in state courts). 
 150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000). 
 151. 28 U.S.C § 1447(c) (2000). 
 152. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000). 
 153. But see Renault, Inc. v. City of Houston, 415 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (remitting a 
jury verdict from $900,00 to $862,500 because of a stipulation that the judgment should not exceed 
$862,500), overruled on other grounds by City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 
1968). 
 154. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938). 
 155. For a discussion of courts’ handling of non-binding damage stipulations, see supra 127-135, 
147-50 and accompanying text. 
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exceeds the jurisdictional requirement and rebut the presumption that the 
damage stipulation creates. When there is doubt, the federal court should 
retain the case because there is no deadline for remand as there is for 
removal. In cases of smaller magnitude, the weight of evidence will trigger 
remand. Because the damage stipulation serves as evidence, the plaintiff still 
serves as master of the claim without manipulating the system. 
Principles of res judicata support the use of damage stipulations as 
evidence. When the amount in controversy is large and exceeds $75,000, the 
dispute could affect many persons.156 In these large disputes, a court should 
allow the defendant the chance to argue on behalf of federal jurisdiction 
despite the damage stipulation. A favorable approach would allow a district 
court to remand the cases with small amounts in controversy and to retain the 
cases with large amounts in controversy. In addition, federal courts should 
resolve some disputes of great magnitude when the amount in controversy is 
high. The case could affect the interests of third persons who are not parties 
to the case, and thus federal courts, which are less subject to political or 
community bias, and not the state courts, should settle the claim. For the 
interests of the parties and the court system, in some cases a post-removal 
damage stipulation for less than the amount in controversy requirement 
should simply serve as evidence, much like an affidavit, that diversity 
jurisdiction does not exist. 
The use of a damage stipulation as evidence fulfills the policies that the 
plaintiff should be master of the complaint and that the plaintiff should not 
manipulate the system by forum shopping. Moreover, in cases where the 
defendant does not present any evidence to establish federal jurisdiction, the 
use of a damage stipulation as evidence creates a good standard for post-
removal damage stipulations, because a party should not have the unbridled 
 156. In the case of a large class action suit, persons who have not elected for exclusion may be 
bound by the judgment of a case to which they were not a party. 48 A.L.R. FED. 675, § 2[a] 677-78. 
The res judicata effects are similar in most circuits. See, e.g., Berr Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 
518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975); Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978); Wren 
v. Smith 410 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969); Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 403 
U.S. 922 (1971); Shrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 470 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Cotton v. Hutto, 577 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 After the court has reached a valid final judgment, a person, not party to the case, could gain an 
unfair advantage against the losing party of the prior case. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1468 (4th ed. 1996). See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1972) (posing the problem with offensive collateral estoppel against 
defendants). There is no clear rule how to handle collateral estoppel; instead, the Supreme Court 
granted trial courts “broad discretion” to determine when collateral estoppel should apply. Id. at 331. 
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power to destroy jurisdiction.157 However, the proposed standard does not 
prevent the defendant from accessing the federal courts when the controversy 
warrants. The defendant may prove that removal is proper by presenting 
evidence to demonstrate jurisdiction. This standard best effectuates the 
competing interests involved in removal. 
In the initially posed hypothetical, one sees that the proposed standard 
effectuates the best result for the competing interests in removal. If the 
Magrittes’ claim is truly for less than the jurisdictional amount, a damage 
stipulation serves as evidence and prevents the defendants from unduly 
manipulating the system. If the Magrittes’ claim is worth more than the 
jurisdictional amount, the defendants can still access the federal courts by 
using evidence. If none of the parties can present any additional evidence, an 
unlikely situation, the evidence of the non-binding damage stipulation can 
bring about a remand of the case.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The current federal courts handle post-removal damage stipulations in 
ways that are irreconcilable with each other. Although the approaches by the 
circuit courts of appeal, most recently the Sixth Circuit, are similar, some 
district courts have taken a conflicting view despite the presence of those 
circuits’ opinions. These disparate approaches leave little certainty to those 
parties with complete diversity who are trying to determine whether the 
federal courts possess diversity jurisdiction. Not all circuits have addressed 
the issue and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari more than once. The 
courts should establish a standard rule for post-removal damage stipulations 
and clarify stipulations’ legal effects. For these reasons, this Recent 
Development proposes a rule to bring uniformity to the federal courts. A 
federal court should consider the damage stipulation as evidence only and not 
allow a damage stipulation destroy the amount in controversy requirement. 
Thus, when there is doubt as to the actual amount in controversy, the federal 
courts should retain the case regardless of the damage stipulation. Because 
 157. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (holding that a state lacked the power to 
impede on the laws of the United States); Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) 
(holding that a state lacked the power to impose conditions that limit a foreign corporation’s rights to a 
federal forum). The Supreme Court also stated that a foreign corporation could not waive its rights to 
the federal forum. Id. See also 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Practice and Procedure § 5, at 606 (1982) 
(“State legislation may neither confer jurisdiction on federal courts nor abridge or impair federal court 
jurisdiction.”). 
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the court may always remand the case if it later finds that the amount in 
controversy has not been met, this standard fulfills a compromise of the 
competing interests involved in removal without unduly favoring either 
party. 
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